A  Failure of Arrogance and Ignored History

Losing a Crusade: 

Afghanistan, the center of gravity in the post-9/11 war on terrorism is unraveling.  A massive opium trade, a dysfunctional central government, rampant corruption at all levels of authority and duplicity by the West’s Pakistani and Arab “allies” have led to the resurgence of organized Taliban militant forces.  Since March, 2006, Afghanistan has suffered the most devastating wave of organized violence since “victory” was declared by the West nearly five years ago.  The unraveling of Afghanistan is a result of arrogant US policy makers’ dismissal of history and culture and overconfidence that Afghan tribal leaders could be threatened or bribed into submission. 

Delusions of grandeur embodied by inexperienced or self-serving United Nations, British, White House and US State Department, Military and Intelligence officials have cost the West the respect and trust needed to sustain peace. This is especially true among disenchanted populations occupied by foreign forces who had claimed to “liberate” them.  Western policy makers are discovering a bitter reality: Without “winning” friendship by effectively addressing basic human needs and understanding the historical behavior and objectives of allies and adversaries, these realities have a tendency to bite back with a vengeance.  The number of American military casualties as of June 18, 2006 had increased to 235 dead and a substantial number wounded. 

The Return of the Taliban:

Despite billions of dollars of promised international assistance and the presence of 23,000 US military forces and a Western-installed government entering its fourth year, the Taliban are returning from their mountain sanctuaries in Pakistan with a disciplined and coordinated offensive capability. They have become a dangerous force in more than half of the country.  The June 12, 2006  International Herald Tribune quoted the United Nations coordinator of assistance in Kandahar as stating, “The situation is really the most unstable and insecure I have seen in the last four years.”  The June 18, 2006 Washington Post reported that the Taliban has gone from operating in company sized units of 100 fighters to battalion sized units of 400 men. 

The US-led coalition is responding to the fierce wave of political violence, which has included suicide bombers and rocket attacks, with increased counter-offensives and a public relations campaign.  The emphasis on the body count of suspected Taliban fighters is reminiscent of the failed tactics of the Vietnam War.  The US relies on its military technologies and a larger number of Air Force strikes than have been conducted in Iraq during the same period of time.  However, the Taliban have adapted to the air strikes, by blending into civilian populations, which has caused increased numbers of civilian casualties.  This has hurt the American image among Afghans and has created increased political pressure on the central government.

On June 22, the Associated Press reported that the usually compliant Afghan President Hamid Kharzai called for an end to indiscriminate US air strikes.  He publicly stated the deaths of “hundreds of Afghans [including Taliban] by US-led forces were not acceptable.”  He stated that the tactics of the coalition forces to hunt terrorists does not focus on the roots of terrorism.  At a press conference, the frustrated Karzai said, “We must engage strategically in disarming terrorism by stopping their sources of money, training, equipment and motivation.” 

The Western Coalition in Afghanistan responded harshly to Karzai’s remarks.  In the June 26 Washington Post, a number of anonymous Western officials said they are “losing faith” in his government and rebuked Karzai as “weak” and incapable of projecting leadership.  “There is an awful feeling everything is lurching downward,” said a Western official.  “Nearly five years on, there is no rule of law, no accountability.  The Afghans know it is all a charade, and they see us not only as compliant but actively involved.  You cannot fight a terror war and build a weak state at the same time.” 

The failure of the central government began at the June 2002 loya jirga or tribal leaders council to choose the new leader of Afghanistan. King Zahir Shah actually had majority support. But the night before the vote, prominent US and United Nations officials postponed the voting session and manipulated the process to assure that their favorite, Karzai, would be the winner. The disrespect shown to the King cost Karzai, and Western-style democracy, credibility among all Afghan tribes, including his fellow Pashtuns. It was a pertinent symbol of failure that American mercenaries had to guard Karzai because he could not find Afghans who he could trust.

Opium, the Fuel of Terrorism:

The revival of the Taliban has been parallel with the dramatic revival of massive opium cultivation in Afghanistan. In 2000-2001 the Taliban enforced a ban on growing opium, not because of religious reasons, but because the international market was saturated. During that period, the United Nations drug enforcement office collected satellite photos of numerous large Taliban warehouses full of narcotics that were being withheld from the market until prices would be forced to rise.

Following the American invasion, the opium trade in Afghanistan has once again become the world’s largest.  In 2005, the Associated Press reports, opium which accounts for more than 35 percent of the impoverished country’s income brought in almost $3 billion in illegal profits to drug lords, Taliban leaders and corrupt government officials. It is expected to increase again in 2006.  Around 345,000 acres of poppies were planted in 2006, an increase of 40 percent from last year. The opium is usually processed into heroin before it leaves the country, providing 90 percent of the world’s supply.

Helmand province is the country’s opium producing center.  On March 18, 2006, Agence France Presse quoted Helmand Governor Muhammad Daud, “Terrorists and narcotics are very close; they’re supporting each other.”  British Lt. Colonel Henry Worsely, of the 3,500 British forces currently deployed in Helmand, explained, “Taliban and drugs feed each other.  You cannot separate them here.”  Facilitating the narcotics trade also benefits radical forces in neighboring Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and in Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence organization [who assisted the Saudis in creating the Taliban].  An American diplomat told the Associated Press that most of the narcotics profits are deposited in banks in the United Arab Emirates.  The U.A.E. was among the few overt financial and political supporters of the Taliban while Osama bin laden dominated Afghanistan. 

Rejection of Western Presence:

Growing popular disenchantment with the West led to widespread street violence in the capital Kabul of May 30, 2006 after an American military truck accidentally crashed into some civilian vehicles in morning traffic.  Mobs attacked Western offices, including humanitarian agencies and a modern hotel was raked with gunfire.  It has not helped the Western image that international contractors live in opulence compared to the ordinary Afghan.  And while everyone has heard of the billions of dollars pledged by the international community to rebuild Afghanistan, most villagers and residents of Kabul continue to live in squalor.  The May 30 riot also followed a highly publicized US air strike that killed at least 16 civilians. 

Surprisingly, some of the anti-Western rioters carried posters of anti-Taliban resistance icon Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was assassinated shortly before the 9-11 attack in New York.  While the Taliban are primarily ethnic Pashtuns, Massoud’s followers are ethnic Tajiks who had been sympathetic to the West.  Groups of protesters tried to reach Karzai’s palace shouting, “Down with Karzai,” and “Down with Bush.”

Sustainable Peace and American Policy

The US State Department, having absorbed the US Agency for International Development [USAID], is increasingly relying on the military to conduct civil affairs. Until recently, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld expressed a guttural reluctance to involve soldiers in “nation building,” even on a short-term basis.  However, even in best case scenarios, it is difficult for the military to perform sustainable peace building missions because of the short-termed mission-orientation of their martial profession.  In rural Afghan villages, despite efforts by American soldiers to distribute aid in exchange for information on the Taliban, most village leaders are politely uncooperative.  More than fearing retaliation by the Taliban for being informers for the occupation forces, all Afghans are traditionally nationalistic. They are steeped in Afghanistan’s history as the “Crossroads of Conquerors.”  They and their ancestors have seen numerous invading armies since antiquity, including Alexander the Great, the Moghuls, the British Empire and the Soviet Union, come and go. 

In order to win the “war on terror” or “clash of civilizations,” international policy makers must acquire a respect for the history and the cultures of the peoples in front-line countries and states.  Peace can only be sustained through mutual respect and built with consistency and trust.  That takes time and patience, beginning with targeted essential assistance in local communities.  

Asia in Focus Number 6 “Peace Begins With Hope.”