Asia In Focus - Number 14

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Asia In Focus - Number 14 : Seeking the Middle Ground Against Terror
March 19, 2007 | Editor Al Santoli

Can Military and Humanitarian Groups Cooperate Effectively?

The Challenge:

The “global war on terror” has grown increasingly precarious. Violence, social chaos and assaults on basic liberties are escalating from across the Middle East and North Africa to the opium-laden mountains of Central Asia to the sweltering islands of Southeast Asia. In response, most senior level Bush Administration officials now state that ending terrorism can only come by addressing its underlying non-military causes. However, their actual emphasis remains based on military-dominated solutions. As a result, the US and its allies appear to be losing the moral high ground.

International security has also been jeopardized in the process. Numerous US military and government officials warn that the growing stress on repeated deployments to war zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan, have diminished the resources, capacity and morale of US forces. In the case of a major crisis in the Middle East or North Asia, -- triggered by perceived vulnerabilities of the world’s Super Power -- US forces may lack the training, equipment and sufficient numbers of soldiers and marines to respond effectively. This danger is articulated in the March 19, 2007 Washington Post article, “Military is Unprepared for Other Conflicts.” Senior US officials told the Post that, “the risk to the nation is serious and deepening because the US military now lacks a large strategic reserve of ground troops ready to respond quickly and decisively to a potential foreign crisis or an outbreak of war... Air and naval power can only go so far in compensating for land forces.”

Foreign policy experts lament the lack of willingness by State Department diplomats to “get out from behind their desks” and take a more assertive role in multi- agency task forces. State and Defense officials claim that the problem is that the civilian agencies don’t have the resources or staff to fill such roles. However, the truth may be somewhere in the middle, as observed by Los Angeles Times reporter Josh Meyer in the March 18, 2007 article “In Terrorism Fight, Diplomacy Gets Shortchanged.” The consensus view expressed by dozens of current and former US officials is that the greatest share of budgets for non- military programs have been shifted from the State Department and USAID to the military. And within the Pentagon, “soft power” programs are getting “squeezed out” as more money goes to support combat operations. While publicly embracing the need to support non-military efforts, the Pentagon’s actual policies appear inflexible.

“Most of the war on terrorism should have nothing to do with guns,” states Robert Richer, recently retired deputy CIA director for operations. “But we have walked away from the hearts-and-minds campaign. The United States is now viewed by many abroad as just an iron fist.”

The role of non-governmental organizations [NGOs] in areas of conflict and terror has also been confused. As senior United Press International columnist Arnauld de Borchgrave pointed out in his March 17, 2007 article “Broken Consensus in Afghanistan,” some 2,000 international NGOs are now represented in Afghanistan spending substantial amounts of money but with limited progress shown. A former Afghan official laments, “They spend over half their time coordinating among themselves.” And with the Taliban and their supporters targeting aid workers for death or kidnapping, few such agencies will send their employees into the field.

The US military has attempted to create Province Reconstruction Teams[PRTs] in Afghanistan and Iraq to gain popular support through social and humanitarian tasks such as building schools and providing medical assistance to remote areas. However, NGOs have been reluctant to be seen as part of military-led PRT operations and the dichotomy in operational cultures and attitude toward the use of force has been a deterrent to successful civilian- military cooperation.

There are instances where NGOs have taken a patient approach to building trust and sustainability, only to have the US or allied military forces arrive and destroy the developmental progress by their fervor to eradicate suspected terrorists. In many cases where civilians have been wounded or killed as collateral casualties, the unfortunate events have driven more recruits into the hands of violent organizations.

At this critical stage, in order to prevent greater tragedy, there is an urgent need for security operations to be tempered with humanitarian guideposts. Inter-agency partnerships in areas of conflict are needed to include appropriate roles for diplomatic professionals and cooperation with non- governmental development agencies. Can such a “Middle Ground” be found?

Seeking the Middle Ground in Muslim Mindanao

A test case of whether a successful security/humanitarian Middle Ground is possible is currently happening in Muslim Mindanao in the southern Philippines, particularly in the archipelago of Sulu. This area, dominated by the Tausug tribe, has long been the most feared area in Southeast Asia. Although it is rich in natural resources, exquisite white sandy beaches and industrious people, the area has been classified by the United Nations as among the most impoverished in the world. For years the area has been off-limits to anyone from outside of the Muslim region. This is due to religious/social conflict with the central government and a terrorist threat posed by a small but ruthless gang known as Abu Sayyaf, whose leaders were originally trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is a place where most outside experts believed that progress was not possible.

In mid-2002, a private NGO, Asia America Initiative was founded by Al Santoli a former US Congressional expert on human rights and international security. The AAI emphasized that success in overcoming violent extremist movements whether in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Iraq, or the Philippines requires building long-term partnerships with war-torn local communities at the grassroots level. AAI believed that tactics relying primarily on force or a top-down infusion of billions of dollars into corrupt or dysfunctional central governments would ultimately fail. The organization emphasized cost-effective programs respecting human dignity to build the friendship and Hope needed to prevent terrorist recruitment. With the support of the Philippine President, the Autonomous Region’s Governor and provincial religious and social leaders, Sulu was chosen as the AAI’s international model for a Development for Peace project.

With a small budget from private donations, AAI’s modest team worked closely in support of Sulu’s local doctors, teachers and social leaders. There were no American military forces in the area and the US embassy in Manila expressed concern for Mr. Santoli’s safety. However, the Philippine military provided logistical support to help deliver AAI’s medicines and school supplies into the remote island area, and when necessary partnered with local police to provide security. By 2003, AAI received a Philippine Presidential Citation for helping to establish peace into the project area through low-cost community partnerships. This, in turn, set the stage for other Philippine and international agencies to provide assistance for a variety of social projects which have helped to largely hold the peace. It also helped to discredit the Abu Sayyaf’s call for violence.

In late 2004, AAI received a modest US Congressional grant which was administered under USAID. The funds were stretched to assist educational development under the DPIS program until early-2006 nearly one year after the grant was scheduled to end. The cost was pennies to the dollar on what is being spent in Iraq and Afghanistan, with the resulting “peace dividend” a product of the friendship created by peoples of different Faiths and cultures working together for the common good.

In late 2005, the arrival of US military advisory teams to train Filipino soldiers to eliminate the remaining Abu Sayyaf gang nearly resulted in a resumption of hostilities with the entire community. The problem was a lack of understanding by the US advisors of the local situation and resulting trauma caused by US backed military operations. The AAI, with the support of Philippine officials, was able to mediate with the local community to resolve misunderstandings. As a result, US military leaders amended their mission to assertively emphasize humanitarian projects such as medical support and construction of roads, wells and a few rural school buildings. The US military’s civil affairs projects have been conducted separately from the ongoing AAI programs. Within months, a number of isolated Abu Sayyaf leaders were eliminated.

The Pentagon has claimed their effort in Sulu to be among the success stories in the war on terror. However, the underlying social and economic conditions that lead to violence continue to persist. The AAI, having proven its effectiveness, is still attempting to further economic development tied into the local education system, but is operating on a shoe string budget of private donations. Meanwhile, the cost of military operations continues to increase. Hard questions need to be asked about why proven cost-effective models that have community backing are being ignored.

To their credit, US uniformed military leaders were among the first officials to voice that exclusive reliance on force is not succeeding. Even at the height of the over-confidence voiced by Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps altered their official Counter Insurgency Doctrines to emphasize the need for a balanced approach that includes social and economic components. However, the military admits that their martial nature and short-term deployments impede their ability to sustain effective community building. Armed forces cannot remain in an area long enough to forge the relationships necessary to build trust with local community leaders – which can take many months or years --especially in communities where combat violence has been intense and the revenge factor is dominant. This underscores why the role of humanitarian NGOs who are not part of military operations are quintessential.

America has proven in the past, such as the post- World War II Marshall Plan in Europe and the pacification of Japan, that development can turn the tide. Those successful models required firm commitment and focused effort by the Executive Branch of government. That is even more complex in today’s globalized environment. It is essential for senior government leaders to direct diplomatic and developmental agencies to coordinate with private sector experts, NGOs and financiers to work as a team. All sectors are needed to help societies rebuild where terror or the threat of religious or sectarian violence threatens to decimate local and international peace.

At this time, the AAI is returning to Sulu with a medical shipment being delivered in late-March by Al Santoli and the Philippines AAI team. AAI has recently been invited and has participated in formal and informal US- based strategy sessions with military planners. They are in a distinct minority who genuinely appreciate the effectiveness of NGO relationships forged through sustained community-based action. The sustainability of peace is tied to the Hope generated by social and economic development, which does take many years to realize. Persistence, patience and careful budgeting of diminishing resources is essential. None of that can happen in an environment dominated by violent extremists.

Development and security are inter-related. Now, more than ever, it is imperative that all of those agencies and organizations involved on the front-line of escalating international conflict work together to realize the power of the Middle Ground.